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Abstract 
We study the impact of corporate networks on the takeover process. We find that better 
connected companies are more active bidders. When a bidder and a target have one or more 
directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully 
completed augments, and the duration of the negotiations is shorter. Connected targets more 
frequently accept offers that involve equity. Directors of the target firm (who are not 
interlocked) have a better chance to be invited to the board of the combined firm in 
connected M&As. While connections have a clear impact on the takeover strategy and 
process, we do not find evidence that the market acknowledges connections between bidders 
and targets as the announcement returns are not statistically different from those bidders and 
targets which are ex ante not connected.  
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Director Networks and Takeovers 
 
Highlights:  
 Firms with one or more common directors have a higher probability to merge. 
 Firms with higher centrality measures are more active acquirers.  
 Negotiations between connected firms are shorter and more often successfully 
completed. 
 Connected bidders more frequently make equity offers.  
 The market does not recognize the impact of connections on the takeover process. 
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Director Networks and Takeovers 
 
1. Introduction 
Traditionally, firms have invited top managers of other corporations or bankers to serve on 
their boards of directors. Despite some restrictions in the UK Corporate Governance Code3, 
interlocking directorships are still common in listed UK companies. The fact that executive 
directors also occupy board positions in firms other than their own can create useful 
connections not just at the personal (director) level but can also be valuable for firms. 
Through such networks, directors develop and strengthen their personal (and social) ties, 
which may lead to more influence in board room discussions. Furthermore, networks enable 
directors to gather information about corporate strategies, sector trends, (macro-)economic 
evolutions, but also about the evolution in executive remuneration, and managerial 
vacancies in other companies.  
 
Over the last decade, director networks have attracted growing academic attention in the 
field of corporate finance and corporate governance. With the help of the network method 
based on graph theory, studies have documented a positive link between networks and firm 
performance (Geletkanycz and Boyd, 2011; Larcker, So and Wang, 2013). The main 
argument is that networks provide better access to information from which the firm can 
benefit in decision making (Omer, Shelley and Tice, 2012; Larcker and Tayan, 2010). More 
recently, researchers have revealed previously hidden relationships between the connections 
of the corporate elite and board room issues such as decision making on managerial 
                                                             
3 The Higgs report (2003) suggested that a full-time executive director of a listed company should not hold 
more than one non-executive directorship and should not be Chairman of another listed company. Furthermore, 
no one should be (non-executive) Chairman of two major (FTSE 100) companies. Within a company, a CEO 
should not also hold the position of chairman. The report does not limit the number of non-executive 
directorship that one can hold (in unlisted firms). At the end of 2003, the Higgs report was incorporated in the 
UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly known as the Combined Code). It should be noted that firms adopt 
this code voluntarily, which stands in contrast to the corporate governance developments in the US where the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act can lead to legal intervention in case of violations against the Act.  
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compensation, hiring and firing of top management, the recruiting of non-executive 
directors, and corporate restructuring. For instance, Liu (2013) shows that a CEO’s 
connections (here labelled as ‘outside options’) enhance his opportunities to leave his firm 
for another challenge. Cai and Sevilir (2010) demonstrate in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) that informational asymmetries are lower when the bidder and the 
target have a common director. Renneboog and Zhang (2011) and Horton, Millo and 
Serafeim (2012) demonstrate that a CEO’s direct and indirect connections affect his power 
and his information-collection value, which is reflected in a higher remuneration.  
 
In this paper, we focus on how the connections of bidder and target firms impact on various 
aspects of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the UK. In a network context, we study the 
frequency of takeovers, the M&A process (in particular, the duration of the negotiation and 
the success versus failure at the end of the negotiation process), the means of payment 
(all-equity, all-cash or mixed offers), the retention or attraction of directors of the target firm 
on the board of the merged firm, and whether there is a differences in terms of abnormal 
returns at the announcement of connected and non-connected M&As.  
 
To analyze the existence of director networks between bidder and target, we resort to 
simulations of matching (potential) targets and bidders among all UK listed companies. To 
find out the determinants of the various aspects of the takeover process mentioned above, 
we use (multi-)nominal probit and tobit models, and as a robustness check sample selection 
models. We find that when two firms are directly connected via their directors, the 
probability that they merge or that one firm takes over the other is significantly higher than 
when the firms are not connected. Takeover activity is not only affected by direct links with 
other firms but also by the indirect connections of the board and of the CEO of the bidding 
firms: if those (executive) directors hold many connections, acquisitions frequently occur. 
So, better connected companies are more active bidders. We demonstrate that when a bidder 
and a target have one or more directors in common, it is more likely that the takeover 
transaction will be successfully completed. In this context, only direct connections play a 
role (and not the indirect proxies for general information collection). Furthermore, 
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connections also significantly reduce the time spent in the negotiation process (both for 
successful or failed negotiations). It is possible that connections lead to an informational 
advantage which may translate into more trust between the parties involved, as connected 
firms more frequently accept equity offers. Directors of the target firm (who are not 
interlocked) have a better chance to be invited on the board of the combined firm in the case 
of a connected M&A.  
While connections seem to have a clear impact on the takeover strategy and process 
(frequency, duration, successful completion, means of payment, board composition of the 
combined firm), we do not find evidence that market acknowledges that some M&As are 
connected (or that it matters in terms of expected value creation) because the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement date are not statistically different from 
zero.  
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the existing literature and 
formulate the hypotheses. In section 3, we present the descriptive statistics of the 
(sub)samples. The results of the empirically analyses are discussed in section 4, and section 
5 comprises our conclusion. 
 
2. Hypotheses and Methodology. 
The information value of director networks consists of directors’ ability to collect 
(non-public) information about the potential target or bidder and about the potential 
synergies in an M&A. Companies with better information access (through networks) are 
more likely to find valuable targets and therefore initiate more takeovers. If the bidder and 
target are directly connected through cross-directorships, these common directors may 
already have disclosed relevant information about the potential benefits of an M&A prior to 
the negotiations. We formulate our hypotheses on the relation between the information value 
of connections and the value, process, and performance of M&A in this section.  
 
2.1. M&A Frequency. 
The first question we ask is whether the frequency of takeover bids initiated by a firm is 
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related to its network; in other words, do takeovers occur more often between firms with 
common directors? It may be that firms who intend to take over another firm or want to be 
taken over, offer a directorship to an (executive) director of a potential target or bidder, 
respectively. This director may gain more information on the counterpart such that 
expensive takeover mistakes can be avoided. The relation between takeover decisions and 
individual director or corporate networks is not necessarily only based on direct links 
between bidder and target as indirect director connections (links not directly with the 
respectively bidder or target but through third boards) may also facilitate information 
transmission across companies. Indeed, better connected companies are more likely to find 
suitable targets and engage more frequently in M&As. Only few studies (Ishii and Xuan, 
2010, and Wu, 2011) have related the takeover probability to corporate (director) relations. 
Both studies focus on the US and show that firm connectedness in an M&A sample is much 
higher than in random samples. We also start our analysis with the method inspired by Ishii 
and Xuan (2010) and use simulation techniques to create different samples from which 
hypothetical pairs of acquirers and targets are selected. We expect that the level of 
connectedness is higher in the takeover sample group than in the simulated samples, which 
leads to the following hypothesis: An M&A is more likely to occur between two firms which 
are directly connected by means of common directors (Hypothesis 1a) and for firms with a 
high indirect centrality scores which proxy for the information collection ability of their 
directors in the universe of (listed) firms (Hypothesis 1b). This is translated into the 
following model:  
(Cumulative) number of M&As = α+β1* (direct or indirect) centrality measure + β2* firm 
characteristics + ε, whereby the centrality measure can be one of the following variables: 
the bidder’s Degree, normalized Closeness measure, its Eigenvector centrality, and its 
(normalized) Betweenness.4 
 
2.2 Duration and Completion of M&A negotiations. 
When the intention of the acquisition of a potential target is disclosed to the market by the 
                                                             
4 For the definitions of Degree and Closeness: see the methodology section. For the definition and calculation 
of other centrality measures (eigenvalue (a direct centrally measure) and betweenness (an indirect centrality 
measure)) which we use as a robustness check, see Renneboog and Zhao (2011). 
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bidder or the target, the target board needs to decide how to react and what advice (rejection 
or acceptance) to give to its shareholders. Upon a negative response by the target board, the 
bidder may make a sweetened offer or initiate a hostile takeover. As a reply, the target 
company may consider accepting an upwardly revised offer or ask permission to the 
shareholders on an extraordinary general meeting to activate various defensive mechanisms 
to protect itself (Goergen et al., 2005; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008b, 2011b). The 
duration of the M&A process (from announcement to deal completion) can be measured. 
The bidder usually prefers to have a short negotiation duration, as a longer waiting time due 
to the target’s resistance increases the transaction costs and uncertainty. Moreover, 
connections between bidder and target may also have an impact on the negotiation duration 
in case of unsuccessful M&As; connections also resolve the information asymmetry 
problem and enable the parties involved to reach the end of negotiation (in this case: the 
bidder withdraws) within a shorter period of time. In sum, we expect that director 
connections shorten the negotiation time, thanks to the directors’ information about the 
counter party or the indirect information value of their network. We also expect networks to 
have an impact on the completion rate of the negotiation process. The completion rate stands 
for the frequency of successfully rounding off the M&A process with a signature that the 
two firms will be merged. M&As of firms involving direct connections or bidders with 
strong information gathering potential (high indirect centrality) successfully reach the end 
the M&A process more frequently (Hypothesis 2a). M&As of firms with direct connections 
and firms with strong information gathering potential (high indirect centrality) experience a 
shorter takeover duration process as well (Hypothesis 2b).  
 
The duration of the M&A negotiation period is counted as the number of days starting from 
the day on which an M&A intention is first publicly disclosed, until the transaction is 
completed (the contract is signed) or the negotiation is abandoned. In some cases, we cannot 
determine the negotiation time as the first public announcement that takeover negotiations 
have taken place only occurs upon completion of the deal. We treat these observations 
separately in our study. 
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2.3. Payment Method.  
An important aspect of the negotiation relates to the payment method. An M&A could be 
concluded in cash, in equity, or in a mixture of both. Information asymmetries between 
bidder and target are an important determinant of the means of payment in corporate 
acquisitions (Renneboog and Martynova, 2009). Faccio and Masulis (2005) document that a 
change in the corporate control structure – for instance, by means of voting power dilution 
or the emergence of an outside blockholder - may discourage bidders from paying for the 
acquisition with equity. Thus, the likelihood of an equity payment is determined by the 
control structures of the bidding and target firms. In particular, a cash payment is strictly 
preferred to an equity payment when the target’s share ownership is concentrated and a 
bidder’s largest blockholder only holds an intermediate or low level of voting power. This 
preference is weakened if the target company is widely held or if the bidder’s dominant 
shareholder has a supermajority of voting rights.  
From a target shareholders’ perspective, the difficulty related to an all-equity offer lies 
within the uncertainty about bidder’s stock value. An equity offer can be interpreted by the 
target as a signal that the stock of the bidder is overvalued. This offer could therefore extend 
the negotiation process as more detailed information on the bidder is to be gathered. If there 
are common directors between bidder and target, we expect that the target is able to assess 
the bidder’s stock value more accurately –overvalued or not - and will be more willing to 
accept an equity offer (at the right offer rate). There are many studies on the payment 
method, but none, save Wu (2011), mention the effect of director networks. Wu (2011) finds 
that connections between bidder and target increase the likelihood of using a stock payment 
by 18.5%. Similarly, we hypothesize that: In M&As with direct connections between 
acquirer and target, offers involving equity occur more frequently (Hypothesis 3). 
 
2.4. M&A Performance. 
A key issue in this paper is that direct and indirect connections at the firm level (and the 
individual director level) create an informational advantage which implies that the acquirer 
is able to select better acquisitions, which is in turn reflected in the creation of more value. 
The question is therefore whether the market recognizes that the bidder makes a connected 
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acquisition. If the market is aware of this type of M&A and is convinced that the bidder is 
hence unlikely to waste resources through an unsuccessful takeover, the bidder’s abnormal 
stock return will be significantly positive upon the announcement of such an acquisition. In 
contrast to the abnormal announcement returns of the target which typically are in the range 
25%-35%, we know that the bidder’s announcement returns are in general very close to zero, 
either slightly negative or slightly positive but on average not statistically different from 
zero. A comprehensive overview of long and short term M&A returns for bidders and targets 
around the world since the early 20th century can be found in Martynova and Renneboog 
(2008a). If the bidder has a well-connected board and is hence better informed, the bidder’s 
CEO may be less likely to succumb to building empires through M&As at the expense of 
value creation. Evidence supporting this hypothesis has been documented for the US by Cai 
and Sevilir (2010). Keeping in mind the benchmark of zero CARs for the bidder around the 
announcement data, we hypothesize: In M&As with direct or indirect connections between 
acquirer and target, the acquirer’s CARs are significantly positive (Hypothesis 4). 
 
The alternative hypothesis is that connected M&As destroy value (in expectation) because a 
connection may induce a false trust in the target. If connections are regarded as substitutes 
for active information collection on the target such that the bidder’s estimation of the 
compatibility between the bidder and the target and of the potential synergy value becomes 
blurred, then connections induce poor takeover decisions. Furthermore, social connections 
(e.g. decision makers in the bidder and target are friends) may contribute to the 
overvaluation of the target. Therefore, acquiring a connected target may be considered as not 
efficient by the investors such that a negative correlation between connections and 
announcement returns is expected, which has been shown by Ishii and Xuan (2010) and Wu 
(2011) for US acquisitions. Both studies show that connected M&As have lower bidder 
announcement returns than unrelated M&As. 
 
2.5. The Bidder’s CEO Compensation. 
Renneboog and Zhao (2011) find a close relation between a CEO’s network and his 
remuneration. They distinguish between different types of centrality variables and state that 
9 
 
direct measures represent managerial power or influence whereas the indirect centrality 
measures capture the degree to which a CEO is able to gather valuable information. Both 
types of networks are related to higher remuneration (higher bonus and higher equity-based 
compensation), but they conclude that the direct network contributes most to excessive CEO 
pay. In the context of this paper, an acquiring company may have contractually committed to 
pay the CEO a bonus if he is able to complete successfully an acquisition. This creates 
strong incentives for a CEO to acquire other firms. The question is here whether a CEO is 
using his own connections and those of his firm to facilitate takeovers in order to get an 
acquisition bonus subsequent to the acquisition. According to Grinstein and Hribar (2004), 
managerial power is the primary driver of CEO bonuses following M&As. It should be 
noted that the vast compensation literature doubts the independence of the CEO in the 
design of his compensation contract, which would be especially the case for powerful CEOs 
with a long tenure (Liu, 2013). Therefore, we hypothesize that CEOs obtain a higher bonus 
when they undertake M&As facilitated by connections between acquirer and target 
(Hypothesis 5). 
 
2.6. Target Director Retention 
We examine whether the directors of the target company have a larger probability, 
subsequent to the M&A, to be on the board of the combined company. If professional 
connections are instrumental to bring M&As to a good end, connected directors of the target 
may have a higher probability to be retained on the board of the merged firm. The 
professional (and social) ties of the directors serving on both the bidder and target boards 
may lead to a higher number of not-connected target directors to be invited to board of the 
combined firms. Some studies document that the retention of the target CEO is positively 
affected by factors including the abnormal stock return of the acquirer (Matsusaka, 1993) 
and social connections to target company (Ishii and Xuan 2010). Hence, we expect that the 
target directors with no prior connections to the bidder are more frequently invited to serve 
on the board of the combined firm if there are connections between the acquirer and target 
(Hypothesis 6). 
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3. Sample Selection, Data Sources, and Descriptive Statistics. 
Our M&A data are gathered from the Thomson One Banker SDC Premium database. We 
collected information about 743 acquisition announcements that involved bidders and 
targets both listed on the London Stock Exchange and took place over the period 1995 to 
2012. We collected stock price, accounting information (total assets, cash ratio, 
debt-to-assets ratio), and other control variables (e.g. return on assets (ROA)) from 
Datastream as well as data on the bidders’ and targets’ individual board members (e.g. the 
number of (non-)executive directorships, cross-directorships between our M&A sample 
firms, ownership stakes by type of shareholder) and on their board structures from the 
BoardEX database.  
The first two columns in Table 1 show the size of our acquisitions’ sample and its 
distribution over time. Most takeover announcements occurred in the periods 1998 to 2000, 
which represents the climax of the fifth takeover wave (Martynova and Renneboog (2006, 
2011a)), and 2005 to 2007 which coincides with the recovery of equity market following its 
prolonged slowdown triggered by the high tech collapse in 2000 (Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004)). Columns (3) and (4) record the number and proportion of takeovers that are 
connected through directors; a larger proportion of connected acquisitions occurred when 
the market for corporate control was booming. On average, 9.4% of all acquisitions are 
connected (Column (5)), a ratio is comparable to the US takeover samples in Wu (2011) and 
Ishii and Xuan (2011) (6.38% and 10.60%, respectively). Table 2 depicts the number of 
acquisitions across industries: takeovers are most frequent in the financial sector and the 
services industry (with respectively, 28.94% and 21.27% of all bidders). Takeovers also 
occur often in manufacturing and retailing sectors. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2] 
The characteristics of the acquisitions such as connectedness, number of announcements per 
bidder, takeover success rate, negotiation time, transaction size, means of payment in the 
offer, and the market response to the takeover announcement are reported in Table 3. Many 
bidders, namely 139 out of 513, have acquired/attempted to acquire more than one target 
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throughout our sample period (Panel A). Amongst them, some were serial bidders acquiring 
up to seven target firms within our sample period. Panel B presents the target’s attitude 
towards to the offer. In the UK market for corporate control, most M&As are friendly, only 
approximately 5% of the deals are hostile takeovers (which are defined as deals with target 
board opposition – whatever the reason). Most offers are all-cash offers (46.3%), almost a 
third are all-equity deals (which include the largest transactions), and about 22% of the 
offers comprise a mix of cash and equity (possibly also of loan notes) – see Panel C. It 
should be noted that our sample includes all bids, both the successful transactions (609) and 
failed ones (134 deals ended with the bidder withdrawing the offer). If we analyse the 
success rate conditional on the bidder and target being connected through their directors 
(Panel D), we find that connected deals have a substantially higher success rate than the 
unconnected ones (96% vs. 81%, the difference being statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence interval). Panel E shows that in 9.4% of the acquisitions, the bidder and target 
have at least one director in common, and on average 16.4% of all directors of the bidder 
and target boards serve on both boards (which implies that some firms are connected 
through multiple directorships – more precisely, in the average M&A transaction, the bidder 
and target have 1.74 directors in common). The statistics about negotiation time are reported 
in Panel F. For the successful deals, the average time between announcement and 
completion is almost two months (59.6 days)5, and in unsuccessful deals the offer is 
withdrawn after a similar time period (of about 60 working days). Note that in some rare 
cases, it can take up to ten months to finalize the transaction. The deal size amounts to GBP 
143 million, with the largest transaction amounting to GBP 1 billion (Panel G). The median 
deal size (the value of the offer scaled by the market value of the bidder) amounts to 0.24, 
which indicates that the bidder is about four times larger than the target. Two thirds of the 
transactions occur between two companies from the same industry, which we call focused 
transactions. In panel H of Table 3, we summarize how the market receives the 
announcement and show the CARs over event windows of different lengths ([-1,+1], [-5,+1] 
and [-10,+10], whereby day 0 is the announcement day). We estimate the market model 
                                                             
5 This statistics is calculated after the 2% observations with longest negotiation time – which are prone to 
recording error - were removed from the sample. 
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over the period 194 to 41 days before the announcement to get the systematic risk. In line 
with earlier research, the announcement CARs [-1,1] for the bidder are indistinguishable 
from zero with a mean of -0.47% and a median of exactly 0%. The 25% and 75% quartiles 
span a range of -2.36% to 1.34%. In the final Panel (I) we present statistics for the number 
of target directors joining combined firm after the deal. On average, one director from the 
target company will remain on the board of the combined company. Note this number does 
not include the ex-ante common directors between bidder and target. Apparently, more 
target directors are invited to serve on the board of the combined company if bidder and 
target had been connected prior to the M&A. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4] 
Table 4 exhibits the bidders’ characteristics. Degree and Closeness are used to measure the 
bidder’s network centrality, but they capture different network properties. In order to 
differentiate and compare the network advantage of the CEO and the entire company, we 
calculate centrality measures on different levels. More specifically, Degree (C) measures the 
number of director interlocks held by a company (hence the C-label); Degree (D) measures 
the number of interlocks at the individual director level (hence the D-label). In this paper, 
we focus on the connectedness of the CEO rather than other directors. Therefore the 
centrality measures at the director level (D) are based on the CEO in that financial year. 
Closeness (C) evaluates how close a company is to all other companies in the network, 
while Closeness (D) takes the individual director as a node. In order to define Closeness, we 
first create a matrix for all the companies (directors) whereby each cell represents a 
connection between the companies (directors) or lack thereof. A cell comprises a one in case 
of a connection and a zero in case of no connection. We define the farness of a vertex as the 
sum of geodesic distances between this vertex and all other vertices that can be reached. We 
transform the matrix into the geodesic distance matrix by replacing all the zeros by the 
geodesic distance. A higher farness value indicates that the vertex is further from other 
vertices. In order to define Closeness (and normalized Closeness), we calculate the inverse 
of the sum of all geodesic paths from vertex v to any other vertex t: 


),(
1
)(
tvd
vC
G
c
. In this 
formula, the Closeness centrality of vertex v (Cc(v)) is equal to one divided by the sum of 
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the lengths of geodesic paths (dG) from v to any other vertex t. A high Closeness value 
reflects the shorter distance to all other vertices, which suggests that the target vertex is 
more central in the network. The normalized Closeness is defined by the following formula 
where n is the number of vertices in the graph: 



),(
)1(100
)('
tvd
n
vC
G
c
. A higher normalized 
Closeness score implies a shorter distance to other vertices, in which case companies 
(directors) may be able to acquire the information faster. The Closeness measure is defined 
over all the connected vertices in the graph (which entails that all isolated vertices do not 
have a closeness measure). Degree proxies for a firm’s (a director’s) direct ability to collect 
information about the target and the bidder, whereas Closeness is an indirect measure that 
shows how close a corporate (or director) node is to other nodes in the whole network of 
corporations (directors). Therefore, closeness focuses on the general information collection 
ability in the entire network, rather than access to information from interlocked companies. 
The reason to differentiate the two is that according to social network theory, information 
from close-by nodes are stronger but more likely to be redundant than that from distant 
nodes. On average, the bidders in our sample have (executive and non-executive) directors 
who hold directorships in six other companies, which is higher than the average Degree (4) 
of all listed UK companies reported in Renneboog and Zhao (2011). Table 4 also reports the 
normalized Closeness at the company level (C), and Degree and normalized Closeness at the 
CEO level (D). The Degree measure at the director’s level is higher than at the corporate 
level as is comprises the links with the directors of all the boards that directors is serving on. 
The average bidder’s board size is 10.5 with a median of 10. The last four rows of Table 4 
contain bidders’ statistics on the ROA, cash ratio, debt ratio, and total assets (in million 
GBP).  
 
4. Results. 
4.1 The Frequency of Connected M&As. 
If it is true that director networks increase the probability of M&As (Hypothesis 1), we 
expect to find more connections between companies in the M&A sample than between 
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randomly matched companies. We therefore compare the level of connectedness of the 
M&A sample – the pairs of bidders and targets in our original sample - to that of three other 
simulation groups drawn from the universe of all listed UK firms. From the descriptive 
statistics, we know that the probability of having at least one common director between a 
bidder and a target is 9.42%. In the first simulation group, we match a bidding company in 
the sample to a potential target company randomly selected from the industry of the real 
target in the year of the acquisition. For instance, in 2007, company A acquired company B 
in the chemical industry. In the simulation, we match company A to another randomly 
selected company C from the chemical industry. By checking the board information of 
company A and the pseudo-target C in the year 2007, we examine whether A and C have 
directors in common. This procedure is repeated for all other bidders in the sample. When 
the pseudo-target happens to be the same company as the real target (C = B), we replace it 
with another company D until D ≠ B. The second simulation group includes the targets from 
our sample matched with randomly selected potential bidding companies from the industry 
of the real bidder in the year of acquisition. The third simulation group includes random 
bidders and random targets selected from the industry of the firms involved in the real 
M&As in the year of the M&A.  
In simulation group 1 (Table 5), the percentage of directly connected companies is 4.38%; 
this is significantly lower than the real percentage of connected firms in our M&A sample 
(9.42%). When we match randomly selected ‘bidders’ (from the same industry as the bidder) 
to the real M&A targets, we do not find any common directors between those bidders and 
targets. Finally, less than 3% pseudo-bidders and pseudo-targets (both are randomly drawn 
from the same industries as the bidder and the target) are connected. We conclude that the 
average level of connectedness is much higher between the real M&A companies than 
randomly paired companies, which supports our first hypothesis that connections matter in 
M&As. Our simulation results are in line with the results from US data presented in Ishii 
and Xuan (2010).  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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We further examine the relationship between M&A activity and the level of connectedness. 
First, we regress the total number of M&As that a bidder undertakes on the network 
centrality of the bidder and other control variables (including board size, corporate 
performance, and the financial structure). The independent variables are the average values 
for the whole sample period. The result is reported in Panel A of Table 6: the Degree 
centrality measure at company level (Average Degree (C)) is positively correlated with the 
number of M&As. This implies that companies with many interlocking directors more 
frequently enter into M&A activity. Regarding the economic importance of this result, if a 
company’s degree centrality increases by five standard deviations, the total number of 
M&As is expected to increase by one. The (normalized) Closeness and the other centrality 
measures at the director (CEO) level, have a positive but insignificant impact on the number 
of M&As. With exception of the debt-to-equity ratio of the bidder, other factors including 
profitability, board size and structure, and ownership structure (now shown) do not affect 
the cumulative number of M&As. In panel B of Table 6, we take as dependent variable the 
cumulative number of deals over time, which is the number of M&As that a bidder initiated 
since the start of our sample period up to a specific point in time. The cumulative 
number-approach considers the M&A activities every year while also taking into account 
the history of M&A activities. We find that all centrality measures significantly increase the 
occurrence of an M&A. This signifies that the when a bidder and its CEO have many 
connections (a high Degree), the takeover activity of this bidder significantly augments. The 
same is valid when the firm is strongly connected to the population of listed firms as 
expressed by its high Closeness.  
Nevertheless, the above analysis cannot rule out one alternative argument that firms 
planning expansions via acquisitions appoint well-connected directors to overcome 
information asymmetries. In other words, instead of connectedness influencing M&A 
probability, it may be other way around. If that is indeed the case, we expect to find that 
well-connected directors (especially the ones connected with the target) are appointed 
shortly before the M&A occurs. However, in the sample, the average tenures of the 
connected directors in the target firm is more than 2.6 years. For most of sample (75%), the 
common director has been on the target board for more than one year when the M&A is 
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announced. On the bidder side, the common director’s average tenure is 3.5 years. Therefore 
it is less likely that establishing connections is solely driven by the purpose of an M&A. 
To sum up, the analyses shown in Tables 5 and 6 yield strong evidence supporting the 
hypotheses 1a and 1b. Namely, we find a positive relationship between takeover frequency 
and connections through directorships between bidder and acquirer. Furthermore, not only 
direct connections between bidder and target are important, but so are the indirect 
connections of the board and the CEO of the bidding firms. In general, better connected 
companies are more active in M&As. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.2 M&A Completion Rate. 
Better connected companies are more likely to engage in M&As. However, are these 
bidding firms also more successful in completing the M&A negotiations (with a signature 
confirming the creation of a combined firm)? In Table 7, we present the results of 6 logit 
models which relate the takeover completion rate to difference measures of connectedness. 
We demonstrate that when a bidder and a target have one (model (1)) or more (model (2)) 
directors in common, the probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully 
completed significantly augments. With one standard deviation increase in the number of 
common directors between the two parties, the M&A success rate increases by 5.1%. 
Models (3) and (5) show that bidders with a high Degree (bidders are connected to many 
firms) are also more successful to bring the M&A negotiations to a successful end. It should 
be noted that only the direct connections have an impact on the completion of the M&A 
process which supports Hypothesis 2a. This is not the case for the indirect connections 
which are captured by the normalized Closeness at the bidder and the bidder-CEO level 
(models (4) and (6)). As predicted, hostile takeover negotiations have a higher chance to fail 
and making a cash offer improves the odds to complete the transaction.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.3 Duration of M&A negotiation. 
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While the previous section has shown that connectedness increases the probability to 
successfully complete the deal, we now analyze whether the M&A negotiation time is 
influenced by director connections. We expect that the time between the first public M&A 
announcement and the completion of the negotiations (whether they are successful or not) 
are shorter when the bidder and target share directors. Connections of this sort can improve 
the information exchange such that less time is needed to complete the negotiations. As the 
negotiation time is a left censored at zero for 18% of the sample, Tobit models are used in 
Table 8. Panel A exhibits that both connection variables (the dummy capturing whether the 
target and bidder are connected and the number of connections between bidder and target) 
are significantly negatively related to the negotiation time. This implies that a connection 
between bidder and target significantly reduces the time used to negotiate the deal. More 
specifically, when the total number of connections between bidder and target increases by 
one standard deviation, the negotiation time will be shortened by 15 days, ceteris paribus. 
This can result from the fact that bidder and target have already acquired much information 
prior to the first public announcement of the bid and/or that the connections stimulate the 
trust in the counterparty. This result is valid both for the subsample of successful M&A 
deals as well as for the full sample including the deals with failed negotiations. 
Consequently, Table 8 provides strong support for Hypothesis 2b. In line with our 
expectations, Panel A also shows that hostile takeovers trigger more resistance in the sample 
of ultimately successful deals. When the offer includes equity, the valuation of the bidder’s 
equity may become an important issue in the negotiation such that more negotiation time is 
required. We also show that larger firms spend more time negotiating.  
In Panel B of Table 8, we add bidder centrality at the company level to the models of Panel 
A. A higher centrality measure, Degree (C), implies that many directors take directorships 
outside the bidding company. In the context of the negotiation process with a target, we find 
that a higher Degree prolongs the negotiation time. This suggests that a board with people 
who hold many outside directorships may negatively affect the efficiency of decision 
making due to lack of monitoring by this ‘busy board’, and may reduce the focus on (and 
increase the duration of) the negotiations with the target firm. The Closeness (at the 
company level) captures how close a firm is to important nodes in the network and is hence 
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proxy for information collection ability within the population of listed UK firms. A high 
Closeness could imply that the bidding firm is better informed about the takeover 
opportunities in the market which hence reduces the negotiation time. The statistical 
significance of Degree and Closeness does not influence the significance of the Connected 
dummy variable and the Number of connections.6  
As a robustness test, we take the models of Panel A and substitute the variables capturing 
the direct connection between bidder and target by – one at the time : (i) Degree at the 
company level (C), (ii) Degree at the director (CEO) level (D), (iii) Closeness at the 
company level (C), and (iv) Closeness at the director (CEO level (D). We find that the 
statistical significance which we have found for these variables in Panel B does not change. 
Another robustness check is survival analysis using hazard models on the sub-sample of 
non-zero negotiation time observations. The result implies that connections shorten 
negotiation time (although insignificantly so). Moreover, deals with more cash in payment 
and smaller bidder company size on average take less time to complete.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
4.4. The Means of Payment. 
From an information value perspective, director networks that span the bidder and target 
provide better information access, which may enable the target to evaluate the synergy value 
as well the bidder’s equity value more accurately. We therefore expect that such connections 
induce trust and that in connected M&A equity is more frequently used as payment. The 
results of Models (1) in Panel A of Table 9 reveal that connections do indeed have a 
significant and positive impact on the use of equity in an M&A offer, which supports 
Hypothesis 3. Models (2), where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the offer consist of cash or is a mixed of cash and equity confirms that connections 
reduce the use of cash in an M&A offer. Expectedly, an equity payment is more likely when 
the relative transaction value is large and the bidder is smaller and less profitable as it is 
then more difficult to raise the bid value in cash. In Panel B of Table 9, we use the 
                                                             
6 We also tested the effect of centrality measures on the individual level, but they do not have a significant 
influence on negotiation time. 
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percentage of cash in the offer as the dependent variable. Since the dependent variable 
varies from 0-1, we use a generalized linear model (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) in the 
estimation. As before, we note that connections reduce the need to offer cash. The 
proportion of cash in the offer will decrease by 6.9% if the number of connections increases 
by one standard deviation. We also include the centrality measures Degree and Closeness, 
but they are statistically insignificant. When we re-estimate the models of Table 9 using a 
multinomial regression, we find results consistent with those reported above (not shown). 
Lastly, as the final payment method may be influenced by the negotiation process, we apply 
a Heckman the sample selection model to condition on negotiation failure, and the results 
remain valid. To sum up, the empirical results on the offered payment method support the 
hypothesis that equity is more likely to be used when bidder and target are connected.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
4.5. M&A performance. 
We study the bidder’s announcement CARs over a three-day event window [-1,1] (starting 
one day before the first public announcement of the M&A (day zero) until one day after the 
event) in order to examine whether connected M&As are expected to perform differently 
than non-connected ones. We find that the bidders’ CARs of connected and non-connected 
M&As are not statically different. In the regression models, both the variable Connection 
between bidder and target (a dummy variable) and the total number of connections between 
them are insignificantly related to the CAR, which implies that the market does not take 
connections into account when they evaluate the M&A transaction (not shown). We also 
cannot find a relation between connectedness measured by Degree and Closeness and the 
CARs. As reported in the vast M&A literature on the means of payment (see Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2008, for an overview), we also find that an all cash payment is associated with 
more positive market reactions. And a larger relative deal value and a larger bidder firm size 
also improve the shareholders’ expected valuation of the deal (at the announcement). We 
conclude that we reject Hypothesis 4; the market does not acknowledge the impact of 
connections on the M&A process and valuation. An alternative explanation could be that 
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even though connections may be acknowledged by the market, their benefit does not 
outweigh their costs which are reflected in insignificant expected returns.  
4.6. The Bidder’s CEO Compensation. 
We also investigate whether or not CEOs receive a higher remuneration after completing 
connected M&As, while we control for corporate performance, CEO characteristics (tenure, 
internal/externally hired, CEO-chairman duality), corporate governance variables (e.g. 
ownership concentration, board structure), and financial information. We find that director 
connections between bidder and target or the CEO’s Degree and Closeness are not a 
significant determinant of his bonus, whereas to firm performance (ROA), CEO experience 
(tenure), and firm size (total assets) do explain that type of remuneration. Hence, in this 
sample of UK bidders, we do not find convincing evidence for a relationship between CEO 
bonus and bidder-target connections and thus reject Hypothesis 5.  
4.7. Retention of Targets’ Directors. 
To examine the target’s director retention, we record the number of target directors who are 
invited as directors on the board of the merged firm and regress this dependent variable on 
variables capturing the connectedness of bidder and target. In order to avoid the 
identification error that interlocked directors are already a director on the bidder’s board 
(and thus on the combined firm’s board), we only count the number of retained directors 
that are not already on the bidder’s board prior to the acquisition announcement. I.e., a 
director is only identified as a retained director if he joined the company after the deal’s 
completion. When focus on Total Retention (model (1) of Table 10), we notice that the 
coefficients of both our connection variables are significant and positive. This implies that 
the target directors (without prior connections to the bidding firm) have a better chance to 
remain on the board of the combined firm when bidder and target are connected by means of 
shared directors. On average, another target director will join the combined firm if the 
number of connections increases by 2 standard deviations. Moreover, director retention is 
more likely when the M&A is not hostile, the bidder and target are in the same industry and 
when the bidder is larger and acquires the target with an offer involving equity. In addition, 
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a larger bidding firm size, a higher cash ratio and a lower debt ratio are also positively 
related to director retention. The above results support hypothesis 6 and are in line with 
results in Ishii and Xuan (2010). However, one potential problem is that the number of 
target director retention may be affected by the size of the bidder’s board. Larger boards 
may be more likely to have extra positions for new directors than small and focused boards. 
In order to remove the board size effect, we replace the dependent variable by the number of 
target director retention scaled by the size of bidder board. The result in models (2) of Table 
10 reveals that the connections-related variables are still positive and that the number of 
connections is significant at the 5% level.7 As a robustness check, we use Heckman sample 
selection models whereby the selection regression is the success versus failure of the M&A, 
and we obtain similar results for the regression equation results. Lastly, Degree and 
Closeness on the company as well as the bidder’s CEO level are not significant when 
included in the above models. In other words, contrary to the direct connections between 
bidder and target, the general network position of the bidder or his CEO does not seem to 
affect target director retention. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion. 
In recent years, some scholars have applied graph theoretical methods in the research on the 
impact of director networks on managerial decision making. They found relations between 
networks and remuneration contracting, the managerial labour market (hiring and firing of 
top management, attracting non-executive directors), corporate restructuring, and firm and 
fund performance. In this paper, we examine the effect of the connections between the 
acquirer and target firms on the takeover process, more specifically on M&A frequency, the 
M&A negotiation success and duration, the means of payment in the offer, the M&A 
expected performance (as reflected in the short term wealth effects of the bidder), the 
bidder’s CEO compensation subsequent to the M&A, and target director retention rate in the 
merged company. The idea is that direct connections enable both parties to gather 
                                                             
7 Since board size is missing for some company years, the sample size of model (2) is smaller. 
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information more easily on the counter party which establishes trust, and that the overall 
network (which includes the indirect connections) enable firms to scout for suitable takeover 
targets and collect relevant information on the whole takeover market. We find that director 
networks play an important role in UK takeovers in the following way: First, we exhibit 
strong evidence on the fact that connections through directorships between bidder and 
acquirer lead to more takeover activity. Not only direct connections between bidder and 
target are important, but so are the indirect connections of the board and the CEO of the 
bidding firms. In a nutshell: better connected companies are more active bidders. Second, 
the above conclusion raises the question as to whether connected bidders just make more 
acquisition attempts or are more successful in completing the M&A negotiations. We 
demonstrate that when a bidder and a target have one or more directors in common, the 
probability that the takeover transaction will be successfully completed significantly 
augments. Only direct connections have an impact on the M&A process but not the proxies 
for indirect connections of information collection. Third, connections also significantly 
reduce the time used in the negotiation process (both for successful or failed negotiations). 
Fourth, we expect that connections yield an informational advantage which could also build 
trust between the parties which would in turn be reflected in the more frequent use of offers 
that involved equity. We confirm that equity is indeed used more often when bidder and 
target are connected. Fifth, the market reaction to the M&A announcement of the bidder is 
not related to connected takeovers. This suggests that the market either does not pick up that 
the two parties involved are connected or that they do not believe it to be important. Sixth, 
while earlier research found a positive relation between a CEO’s level of connectedness and 
his remuneration, we do not find evidence that CEOs of connected bidders are paid more 
subsequent to completing a connected M&A. Finally, the target directors (without prior 
connections to the bidding firm) have a better chance to be invited to the board of the 
combined firm when bidder and target were directly connected.  
The paper has contributed to our understanding of M&As and director networks. At first 
sight, interlocked directors and directors’ information collection ability (proxied by 
centrality measures) makes the M&A process more efficient: the degree of connectedness 
increases the number of M&A transactions, increases the successful completion rate, 
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reduces the negotiation time, and enables the bidder to offer equity. Still, it seems that the 
market does not recognize the fact that the parties involved are connected or attaches little 
value to it as the announcement share price reactions in connected M&As are small and not 
difference from those of unconnected M&As.  
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Table 1. (Connected) Acquisitions. 
This table gives an overview of the number of acquisitions by year (Column (1)) over the period 1995 to 
2012 and the percentage of acquisitions by year (based on all acquisitions over the whole period) 
(Column (2)). The table also shows the number (and percentage) of connected acquisitions in which the 
bidder and target firms share at least one director (Columns (3) and (4)). The last column shows the 
percentage of connected acquisitions (considering all acquisitions) by year. Source: SDC. 
 
 
(1)  
Number of 
acquisitions 
(2)  
Distribution of 
all acquisitions 
over time (%) 
(3)  
Number of connected 
acquisitions 
(4)  
Distribution of 
connected acquisitions 
over time (%) 
(5)  
% of Connected 
acquisitions by year 
Year      
1995 33 4.44 2 2.86 6.06 
1996 49 6.59 7 10.00 14.29 
1997 51 6.86 9 12.86 17.65 
1998 65 8.75 7 10.00 10.77 
1999 90 12.11 4 5.71 4.44 
2000 66 8.88 1 1.43 1.52 
2001 30 4.04 1 1.43 3.33 
2002 21 2.83 1 1.43 4.76 
2003 40 5.38 4 5.71 10.00 
2004 27 3.63 3 4.29 11.11 
2005 53 7.13 7 10.00 13.21 
2006 42 5.65 5 7.14 11.90 
2007 44 5.92 2 2.86 4.55 
2008 41 5.52 3 4.29 7.32 
2009 34 4.58 5 7.14 14.71 
2010 32 4.31 4 5.71 12.50 
2011 19 2.56 5 7.14 26.32 
2012 6 0.81 0 0 0 
Total 743 100 70 100  
Average     9.42 
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Table 2. Acquisitions by Bidder and Target Industry. 
This table shows the percentage of bidders and targets by industry. Source: SDC. 
 
Bidder Industry Sector % Target Industry Sector % 
Agriculture 0.54 Agriculture 0.40 
Chemicals 4.17 Chemicals 4.17 
Construction 3.23 Construction 4.17 
Finance 28.94 Finance 23.01 
Food 3.1 Food 2.15 
Furniture 0.4 Furniture 0.54 
Manufacturing 9.29 Manufacturing 11.57 
Mining 4.71 Mining 5.38 
Printing 4.31 Printing 3.63 
Retailing 9.29 Retailing 10.63 
Services 21.27 Services 23.55 
Telecommunication 5.65 Telecommunication 5.38 
Textile 1.35 Textile 1.75 
Transportation 2.29 Transportation 1.88 
Utilities 1.48 Utilities 1.75 
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Table 3. M&A Transaction Characteristics. 
Panel A shows the statistics on the number of M&A announcements per bidder over the sample period. 
Panel B reports the target’s attitude towards the deal. Friendly means that the target board recommends 
the offer; Hostile reflects that the target board officially rejects the offer but that the bidder persists with 
the takeover. Panel C reports the different types of means of payment in the acquisition: all cash, all 
equity, or mixed offers. Panel D records the completion rate by subsample. Panel E reports the 
connections between bidders and targets. The dummy variable Connected equals one if the bidder and 
target share at least one director at the time of acquisition (according to the most recent information prior 
to the acquisition). The number of connections at the board level gives the number of shared directors 
between the bidder and target. St.dev. stands for standard deviation. Panel F presents the negotiation time 
of the acquisition which is defined as the difference between the announcement and completion dates of 
the takeover. Panel G reports the deal size (in million GBP), the relative deal size (deal size dividend by 
market value of the bidder), and whether target and bidder belong to the same sector which we call a 
focused transaction (dummy= 1, and 0 otherwise). Panel H reports the bidder CARs for the event 
windows: [-1,+1], [-5,+5] and [-10,+10]. Panel I reports the number of directors from the target joining 
the combined company after M&As. Note these statistics have been adjusted for the number of common 
directors to avoid double counting. Source: SDC, Datastream and BoardEX. 
 
Panel A. Number of M&A Transactions by Bidder 
Number of deals by 
bidder 
Number of 
bidders 
Percentage 
  1 374 72.90 
2 92 17.93 
3 26 5.07 
4 7 1.36 
5 7 1.36 
6 5 0.97 
7 2 0.39 
Total 513 100 
 
Panel B. Attitude towards the Takeover 
Attitude Frequency Percentage 
Friendly 704 94.75 
Hostile 39 5.25 
Total 743 100 
 
Panel C. Payment Method 
Payment method Frequency Percentage 
Cash only 294 46.30 
Equity only 202 31.81 
Mixed 139 21.89 
Total 635 100 
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Panel D. Takeover Completion Rate 
Group Completed Deals  
Total takeover 
announcements  
Success rate 
All  609 743 81.97% 
Not-Connected 542 673 80.53% 
Connected 67 70 95.71% 
Sample/mean 
difference test 
 Mean Standard Deviation  T-statistic 
Not-Connected 0.805 0.014 
2.95 
Connected 0.957 0.024 
 
Panel E. Connectedness of Bidder and Target 
 
N Mean St.dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Connected (dummy) 743 0.094 0.292 0 0 0 0 1 
Number of connections 743 0.164 0.799 0 0 0 0 17 
Number of connections  
(for connected M&As) 
70 1.743 2.019 1 1 1 2 17 
 
Panel F. Negotiation Time 
 N Mean St.dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Successful deals 594 59.602 49.141 0 23 56 85 293 
Withdraw offers 129 60.333 52.646 1 26 45 82 256 
All 723 59.733 49.747 0 24 55 83 293 
 
Panel G. Deal Size, Relative Deal Size, and Focused Transaction 
 N Mean St.dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Deal size (GBP m) 578 143.392 211.155 0.050 14.380 52.525 162.58 996.9 
Relative deal size  544 1.733 20.770 0.0001 0.062 0.243 0.662 480.1368 
Focused M&A  743 67.2% 47.0% 0 0 1 1 1 
 
Panel H. Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns for the Bidder 
CAR (%) N Mean St.dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
[-1,+1] 666 -0.47 6.35 -37.96 -2.36 0.00 1.34 63.75 
[-5,+5] 666 -0.94 9.40 -64.85 -4.30 -0.13 1.89 94.32 
[-10,+10] 666 -1.37 11.65 -72.28 -5.76 -0.21 3.22 52.75 
 
Panel I. Target Director Retention 
 N Mean St.dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Retention (all) 743 1.292 3.287 0 0 0 1 36 
Retention (connected) 70 2.729 4.370 0 0 1 3 18 
Retention (unconnected) 673 1.143 3.119 0 0 0 1 36 
 
 
                                                             
8 The outlier is Lasmo plc which acquired Monument Oil and Gas plc with a market value of GBP 1.25b, 
which leads to the very high relative deal size. Lasmo was acquired by ENI two years later. 
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Table 4. Bidder Characteristics. 
This table summarizes the corporate governance and financial information on the bidders. Degree and 
Closeness are the centrality measures of the bidder in the director networks. They are calculated on the 
company level (C) as well as director level (D) (see Section 3). This table also reports board size, return 
on assets (ROA), cash-to-assets ratio, debt-to-assets ratio, and total assets (in millions GBP). 
 
 
N Mean St.dev. Min 25% Median 75% Max 
         Degree (C) 341 6.21 5.17 0 2 5 9 29 
Closeness (C) 311 0.41 0.14 0.07 0.25 0.43 0.55 0.59 
Degree (D) 341 12.39 8.38     0 7 10 15 55 
Closeness (D) 341 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09 
         
Board size 341 10.49 4.054 2 8 10 13 23 
 
        
ROA (%) 615 4.44 6.53 -24.53 1.41 5.54 8.67 16.59 
Cash-to-assets ratio (%) 511 31.36 26.13 0 10.71 23.47 47.91 99.46 
Debt-to-assets ratio (%) 643 0.21 0.17 0 0.05 0.18 0.33 0.76 
Total assets (in mil. GBP) 668 153.25 171.01 4.72 28.85 81.78 218.02 734.80 
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Table 5. Connected Bidders and Targets. 
This table measures the number of directly connected firms through director interlocks for different 
samples: a. our takeover sample and b. random samples of bidder and target matched-up groups of firms 
(whereby the random samples are drawn from the universe of all listed UK firms). The first row 
(simulation group (1)) reports the number of connections between the bidders in the sample and random 
targets. The random targets belong to the same industry as the real target. For simulation group (2), we 
select a random company as a pseudo bidder for each target in the sample. Then, we examine whether the 
two companies are connected via directors. Simulation group (3) is based on a similar simulation exercise, 
but this time both the bidder and the target are randomly selected. The final row is based on the bidders 
and targets in the actual sample. 
 
 
Bidder Target 
Percentage of 
connected deals 
    
Simulation group (1) From M&A sample Random 4.38% 
Simulation group (2) Random From M&A sample 0.00% 
Simulation group (3) Random Random 2.63% 
Sample group From M&A sample From M&A sample 9.42% 
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Table 6. The Number of M&As. 
This table reports the OLS regression with the total number of M&As (panel A) and the cumulated 
number of M&As (panel B) as the dependent variable. Degree and (normalized) Closeness are used to 
measure the bidder’s centrality in the network. (C) and (D) stands for networks on the company level and 
the director (here taken as the CEO) level, respectively. Board size measures the number of executive and 
non-executive directors on the board. Relative boardsize is board size scaled by total assets. ROA is the 
return to assets of the bidder. Cash to total assets is the total cash and cash equivalents divided by total 
assets. Debt to total assets captures the bidder’s leverage. We measure the size of the bidder by its total 
assets value (logarithm). Standard errors are between brackets; ***, **, * stand for statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Total Number of M&As 
   
Average Degree (C) of bidder 0.044*    
 (0.023)    
Average Closeness (C) of bidder  0.996   
  (0.673)   
Average Degree (D) of bidder   0.017  
   (0.015)  
Average Closeness (D) of bidder    4.742 
    (3.610) 
Average Board Size -0.004 0.013 0.006 0.013 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) 
Average ROA 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Average Cash-to-total assets 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Average Debt-to-total assets 1.307** 1.396** 1.349** 1.291** 
 (0.564) (0.622) (0.568) (0.567) 
Average Total assets (Logarithm) 0.011 0.034 0.032 0.037 
 (0.060) (0.064) (0.059) (0.058) 
Number of Observations 191 169 191 191 
R-squared 0.0773 0.0704 0.0659 0.0683 
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 Panel B: Cumulative Number of M&As 
   
Degree (C) of bidder 0.079***    
 (0.018)    
Closeness (C) of bidder  0.954*   
  (0.568)   
Degree (D) of bidder   0.023**  
   (0.011)  
Closeness (D) of bidder    6.952** 
    (3.111) 
Relative board size 0.403 0.914** 0.653* 0.840** 
 (0.357) (0.386) (0.376) (0.349) 
ROA 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cash-to-total assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Debt-to-total assets 1.382*** 1.283*** 1.403*** 1.188*** 
 (0.429) (0.484) (0.445) (0.444) 
Total assets (Logarithm) -0.052 0.023 0.002 0.027 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.041) 
Number of Observations 258 231 258 258 
R-squared 0.1645 0.1078 0.1125 0.1155 
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Table 7. The Takeover Success Rate. 
This table reports the logit regression results of the success rate of M&A transactions: the dependent 
variable equals 1 if the M&A was successful, and 0 if withdrawn. The network variables are: Connected 
(dummy) is a dummy variable which equals one if the bidder and target is connected via common 
director(s); Number of connections is the number of common directors; Degree and (normalized) 
Closeness measure the bidder’s centrality in the network with (C) and (D) representing networks at the 
company level and CEO level, respectively. We control for: Same sector (dummy) equals one if the bidder 
and target belong to the same industry; Hostile (dummy) is one if the target’s board rejects the bid; All 
cash payment (dummy) equals one if the transaction is performed by means of an all-cash payment, and 
zero in case of all-equity or mixed payment; Relative deal size is the transaction value in GBP scaled by 
the market capitalization of bidding company. Standard errors are between brackets; ***, **, * stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Bidder and target are  0.834**      
  connected (dummy) (0.364)      
Number of connections  0.317*     
  between bidder and target  (0.188)     
Degree (C) of bidder   0.091***    
   (0.033)    
Closeness (C) of bidder     0.716   
    (0.802)   
Degree (D) bidder      0.046**  
     (0.021)  
Closeness (D) of bidder       3.985 
      (4.573) 
Same sector (dummy) -0.046 -0.047 -0.220 -0.149 -0.222 -0.228 
 (0.157) (0.156) (0.264) (0.269) (0.263) (0.260) 
Hostile (dummy) -1.527*** -1.524*** -1.784*** -1.704*** -1.746*** -1.673*** 
 (0.253) (0.253) (0.443) (0.423) (0.443) (0.419) 
All cash paym. (dummy) 0.295** 0.285** 0.072 0.299 0.198 0.246 
 (0.143) (0.142) (0.236) (0.231) (0.223) (0.220) 
Relative deal size -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0001 0.001 0.0002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
       
Number of Obs. 542 542 256 231 256 256 
R-squared 0.1186 0.1115 0.161 0.1263 0.1407 0.1139 
 
 
  
35 
 
Table 8. Negotiation Time. 
Panel A reports the (left censored) Tobit regression results of the negotiation time in M&A transactions. 
Negotiation time is the difference between announcement and accomplishment dates. Two network 
variables are used to measure the connectedness between the bidder and target: Connected (dummy) 
equals 1 if the bidder and target is connected via common director(s) and 0 otherwise. Number of 
connections is the number of common directors between bidder and target. Degree and (normalized) 
closeness are used to measure the bidder’s centrality in the network. (C) stands for networks on the 
company level. We use four variables to control for deal nature and for the bidder’s characteristics: Same 
sector (dummy) equals 1 if the bidder and target belong to the same industry;  Hostile (dummy) is 1 if the 
target’s board rejects the bid (for whatever reason); All cash payment (dummy) equals 1 if an all-cash 
offer is made, and 0 in case of all-equity or mixed offers; Relative deal size is the transaction value in 
GBP scaled by the market capitalization of bidding company; Cash-to-total assets is calculated as the 
total cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets; Debt-to-total assets is the capital structure of 
bidder. The bidder’s size is the logarithm of total assets value (book value). Panel B expands the previous 
models by including the centrality measures at the company level. Standard errors are between brackets; 
***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
 Panel A: Negotiation time 
 Success All 
     
Bidder and Target are  -21.141**  -21.501**  
  connected (dummy) (8.787)  (8.902)  
Number of connections   -9.955**  -10.119** 
  between bidder and target  (4.899)  (4.965) 
Same sector (dummy) -8.973 -9.401 -7.690 -8.041 
 (5.920) (5.945) (5.587) (5.606) 
Hostile (dummy) 36.554** 37.297** 9.714 10.254 
 (17.564) (17.597) (10.782) (10.795) 
All cash payment (dummy) -42.360*** -42.040*** -37.011*** -36.746*** 
 (5.821) (5.829) (5.381) (5.387) 
Relative deal size 1.960 1.987 -0.043 -0.034 
 (1.703) (1.707) (0.788) (0.790) 
ROA 0.098 0.099 0.100 0.101 
 (0.142) (0.142) (0.137) (0.137) 
Cash-to-total assets 0.056 0.074 0.042 0.057 
 (0.116) (0.117) (0.109) (0.109) 
Debt-to-total assets 0.364 3.234 -0.749 1.656 
 (19.119) (19.085) (17.852) (17.829) 
Total assets (logarithm) 8.815*** 8.705*** 6.787*** 6.684*** 
 (1.676) (1.678) (1.574) (1.575) 
     
Number of Observations 331 331 392 392 
R-squared 0.0244 0.0238 0.016 0.0155 
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Panel B:  Negotiation time 
 Success All 
     
Connected (dummy) -26.635**  -29.992**  
 (13.256)  (13.324)  
Number of connections  -18.860**  -21.006** 
  (8.678)  (8.735) 
Degree (C) 2.759** 2.811** 2.076** 2.126** 
 (1.099) (1.097) (1.031) (1.030) 
Closeness (C) -75.141** -77.875** -57.779** -60.904** 
 (30.220) (30.101) (28.252) (28.160) 
Same sector (dummy) -5.455 -6.317 -5.110 -5.939 
 (8.910) (8.949) (8.585) (8.620) 
Hostile (dummy) 82.080** 83.151** 33.939* 34.520* 
 (37.051) (36.981) (18.114) (18.072) 
All cash payment (dummy) -40.198*** -40.173*** -38.729*** -38.671*** 
 (8.568) (8.560) (7.990) (7.984) 
Relative deal size 0.114 0.078 -0.329 -0.350 
 (2.170) (2.167) (1.244) (1.243) 
ROA -0.279 -0.249 -0.115 -0.086 
 (0.325) (0.326) (0.316) (0.316) 
Cash-to-total assets -0.243 -0.228 -0.125 -0.109 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.172) (0.172) 
Debt-to-total assets 3.998 8.469 3.523 7.926 
 (25.918) (25.810) (24.697) (24.600) 
Total assets (logarithm) 2.657 2.348 2.422 2.111 
 (3.004) (3.003) (2.795) (2.795) 
     
Number of Observations 166 166 192 192 
R-squared 0.0255 0.026 0.0193 0.0198 
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Table 9. The Means of Payment. 
Panel A presents the results of logit regressions on the type of means of payment in the offer. The 
dependent variable in Models (1) equals 1 if the M&A is concluded with an offer that includes equity (an 
all-equity transaction or a mixed payment), and equals zero in case of an all-cash payment. In Models (2), 
we test the use of offers involving cash (in case of cash or mixed payment the dummy equals one, and 
equals zero in case of an all equity offer). Connected (dummy) equals one if bidder and target is 
connected via common director(s). Number of connections is the number of directors that a bidder and 
target share. Same sector (dummy) equals one if the bidder and target are from the same industry. Hostile 
(dummy) is one if the offer is (initially) rejected by the target’s board. Relative deal size is the transaction 
value scaled by the market capitalization of bidding company. ROA is the bidder’s return to assets. 
Cash-to-total assets is the total cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. Debt-to-total assets is of 
the bidder’s leverage. Size is total assets’ book value (logarithm). Panel B gives the results of a 
generalized linear model on the means of payment. The dependent variable is the percentage of cash in 
the offer. Standard errors are between brackets; ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively.   
 
 Panel A: Type of Offer  
 (1)  
All equity or mixed payment 
(2) 
All cash or mixed payment 
     
Connected (dummy) 0.646*  -0.936**  
 (0.357)  (0.366)  
Number of connections  0.3011  -0.343* 
  (0.204)  (0.203) 
     
Same sector (dummy) 0.168 0.177 -0.147 -0.151 
 (0.228) (0.228) (0.259) (0.258) 
Hostile (dummy) 0.332 0.315 -0.723 -0.656 
 (0.463) (0.462) (0.463) (0.461) 
Relative deal size 0.254* 0.251* -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.033) (0.032) 
     
ROA -0.007 -0.007 0.015** 0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cash to total assets 0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Debt to total assets 0.227 0.149 1.277 1.411 
 (0.734) (0.731) (0.878) (0.872) 
Total assets (logarithm) -0.217*** -0.212*** 0.300*** 0.289*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.077) (0.075) 
     
Number of Observations 403 403 403 403 
R-squared 0.0670 0.0651 0.1077 0.1004 
 
38 
 
 Panel B: Percentage of Cash in Offer 
Connected (dummy) -0.841 ***  
 (0.325)  
Number of connections   -0.378 ** 
  (0.205) 
   
Same sector (dummy) -0.047 -0.055 
 (0.218) (0.217) 
Hostile (dummy) -0.589 -0.561 
 (0.408) (0.407) 
Relative deal size -0.062 -0.061 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
   
ROA 0.010 * 0.010 * 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Cash to total assets -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Debt to total assets 0.292 0.397 
 (0.679) (0.676) 
Total assets (logarithm) 0.263 *** 0.256 *** 
 (0.062) (0.061) 
   
Number of Observations 395 395 
R-squared 0.1277 0.1218 
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Table 10. Target Director Retention in the Combined Firm. 
The table reports the results of regressions for the retention of the targets’ directors in the combined 
company subsequent to the M&A. The dependent variable in Models (1) (Poisson model) is the number 
of unconnected targets’ directors joining the combined company’s board while this variable in Models (2) 
(OLS) is the number of retained directors as a percentage of the bidder’s board. Two variables are used to 
measure the connections between bidder and target: Connected (dummy), a dummy variable which equals 
1 if bidder and target are connected via (a) director(s); Number of connections, the number of directors 
which bidder and target have in common. Same sector (dummy) equals one if bidder and target are from 
the same industry. Hostile (dummy) is 1 if the M&A is considered as hostile by the target. All cash 
payment (dummy) equals one if the transaction is completed with an all-cash payment and zero in case of 
an all-equity or mixed offer. Relative deal size is the transaction value scaled by the market capitalization 
of bidding company. ROA is the bidder’s return on assets. Cash-to-total assets is calculated as the total 
cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. Debt-to-total assets is used to measure the capital 
structure of bidder. The size of the bidder is the total assets value (logarithm). Standard errors are 
between brackets; ***, **, * stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
 (1) 
Total Retention 
(2) 
Total Retention/Board Size 
Connected (dummy) 0.653***  0.127  
 (0.103)  (0.080)  
Number of connections  0.381***  0.094** 
  (0.046)  (0.044) 
     
Same sector (dummy) 0.400*** 0.446*** 0.081 0.088* 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.054) (0.054) 
Hostile (dummy)  -0.484** -0.486** -0.111 -0.110 
 (0.218) (0.218) (0.120) (0.119) 
All Cash -0.505*** -0.490*** -0.056 -0.056 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.050) (0.049) 
Relative deal size -0.023 -0.023 -0.001 0.0003 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
ROA -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cash-to-total assets 0.004** 0.003* 0.002* 0.002* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Debt-to-total assets -1.051*** -1.089*** -0.067 -0.088 
 (0.302) (0.299) (0.155) (0.154) 
Total assets (logarithm) 0.108*** 0.104*** -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.016) (0.015) 
     
Number of Observations 403 403 220 220 
R-squared 0.0744 0.0806 0.0566 0.0662 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions. 
Variable Name Description Source 
Dependent variables   
Takeover success rate Equals 1 if the M&A was successful, and 0 if withdrawn Thomson Reuters SDC 
Negotiation time 
The gap between the announcement of the deal 
completion or failure of the negotiations and the first 
public announcement of that takeover negotiations are 
taking place 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
All equity or mixed payment 
Equals 1 if the M&A is completed with an all-equity or 
mixed payment (equity and cash, and potentially with 
loan notes) 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
Cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) 
Cumulative abnormal stock return over an event window 
around the first public announcement 
Datastream, calculation 
Total director retention 
The number of target directors joining the board of the 
bidding company subsequent to the takeover transaction 
BoardEx, Manifest, Thomson Reuters 
One Banker 
Director retention as a percentage of bidder board 
Total director retention divided by the bidder’s board 
size priori to M&A 
Boardex, Manifest, Thomson Reuters 
One Banker 
Centrality and connections    
Degree (C) Number of companies connected by common directors Boardex,Manifest, calculation 
Degree (D) Number of directors connected to the bidder CEO Boardex,Manifest, calculation 
(normalized) Closeness (C) 
The inverse of the sum of geodesic distances from 
bidder to all other companies, scaled by total number of 
reachable companies in the network 
Boardex,Manifest, calculation 
(normalized) Closeness (D) 
The inverse of the sum of geodesic distances from 
bidder CEO to all other directors, scaled by total number 
of reachable directors in the network 
Boardex,Manifest, calculation 
Connected (dummy) 
Equals 1 if the bidder and target have directors in 
common 
Boardex,Manifest, Thomson Reuters 
SDC 
Number of connections 
The number of shared directors between bidder and 
target 
Boardex,Manifest, Thomson Reuters 
SDC 
Number of connections/directors 
Number of connections divided by the bidder’s board 
size 
Boardex,Manifest, Thomson Reuters 
SDC 
M&A characteristics   
Same sector (dummy) Equals 1 if the bidder and target belong to same sector Thomson Reuters SDC 
Hostile (dummy) Equals 1 if the M&A is hostile Thomson Reuters SDC 
All cash payment (dummy) Equals 1 if the M&A is paid in cash only Thomson Reuters SDC 
Relative deal size 
Transaction value (in GBP) scaled by the market 
capitalization of bidding company 
Thomson Reuters SDC, calculation 
Total relative deal size 
The sum of the transaction values of all M&As in a 
financial year scaled by the market capitalization of 
bidding company 
Thomson Reuters SDC, calculation 
Multiple deals 
The number of M&As announced on the same day by 
the bidder 
Thomson Reuters SDC 
(Cumulative) number of M&As The number of M&As by a bidder over the sample Thomson Reuters SDC 
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period 
Bidder characteristics   
ROA (%) 
Net income prior to tax and interest divided by total 
assets, and then multiplied by 100 
Datastream 
Relative board size 
Board size divided by total number of directors on the 
board 
Boardex,Manifest,Datastream, 
calculation 
Cash to total assets (%) 
Total cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets, 
and then multiplied by 100 
Datastream 
Debt to total assets (%) 
Sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total 
assets, and then multiplied by 100 
Datastream 
Total assets 
Sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, 
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other 
investments, net property plant and equipment and other 
assets. We take the logarithm of total assets. 
Datastream 
 
 
